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In re Estate of Miller, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 (Sept. 24, 2009)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – FEE SHIFTING PROVISIONS 
  
 This case is an appeal and cross-appeal from the district court’s order denying the 
defendant’s motion for attorney fees but awarding costs in a case pertaining to the distribution of 
the decedent’s (Rose Miller’s) estate. 
Summary 
 Reversed and remanded.  The Nevada Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed the 
district court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for attorney fees and remanded the case for 
further proceedings   The Court held that (1)  a judgment obtained on or after appeal can qualify 
as a “more favorable judgment” for purposes of the fee-shifting provisions of NRCP 68
Disposition/Outcome 
2 and 
NRS 17.115,3 (2) appellate fees are recoverable, and (3) an unrepresented party who serves an 
offer of judgment may recover fees later paid to a lawyer hired to prosecute or defend the case. 
 The underlying dispute in this case involved a contest over the distribution of Rose 
Miller’s estate.  The defendant, Barbara LePome, proceeding without a lawyer, initially made 
separate offers of judgment to the plaintiffs, Marilyn Berkson and Gertrude Malacky, for 
$12,500 each.  Berkson and Malacky refused LePome’s offers of judgment, and LePome 
subsequently hired a defense attorney.   
Facts and Procedural Background 
 After a unanimous jury verdict, the district court ruled in favor of Berkson and Malacky.  
On appeal, however, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed and ruled LePome deserved judgment 
as a matter of law.  As a result, Berkson and Malacky ultimately failed to receive more favorable 
judgments than LePome’s $12,500 offer.   
 The Nevada Supreme Court issued a remittitur, and LePome then moved at the district 
court level for the attorney fees she incurred during her appeal.  The district court held that 
LePome was not entitled to the costs and attorneys fees she incurred during her appeal under 
NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115.   
Both parties appealed the district court’s judgment. Berkson and Malacky argue that a 
judgment rendered by the district court upon remittitur cannot serve as the basis for an award of 
attorney’s fees and costs under Nevada law.  In their view, the district court’s judgment before 
the initial appeal was binding.  Second, Berkson and Malacky argue that an offer of judgment 
does not include post-offer fees and costs incurred on appeal.  Finally, Berkson and Malacky 
argue that because they rejected LePome’s $12,500 offer under the impression she was 
unrepresented by an attorney, she is not entitled to attorney fees and costs.4
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  LePome, on the 
2NEV. R. CIV. P. 68. 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.115 (2007). 
4See Sellers v. Dist. Court, 119 Nev. 256, 259, 71 P.3d 495, 498 (2003) (holding that a litigant must pay attorney 
fees to receive an award of attorney fees if he or she prevails in court). 
other hand, appealed the district court’s holding that she was not entitled to the attorney fees and 
costs she incurred during her initial appeal.  
 The Court determined that a party’s eligibility for a fee award is a matter of statutory 
interpretation, a question of law and, accordingly, the proper standard for review is de novo.  
Discussion 
 Contrary to Berkson and Malacky’s arguments, the Court first held that a district court’s 
judgment as a result of appellate reversal can serve as the basis for attorney’s fees and costs.   
Relying on NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115, the Court emphasized that fee shifting penalties are 
assessed against an offeree who “rejects an offer and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment.”5
Next, the Court held that the fee-shifting provisions allow a party to recover appellate 
costs and fees and nothing in the language of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 suggests otherwise.  To 
reinforce its holding, the Court emphasized that other jurisdictions with similar statutory 
provisions also allow a party to recover post-offer fees and costs incurred on appeal.
  
The Court concluded that the word “judgment” in those provisions connotes a final judgment.  
Appellate reversals comprise a final judgment binding upon the parties and district court.  
Accordingly, the Court held that the fee-shifting provisions in NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 apply 
to the judgment that determines the final outcome in the case which, in the event of an appellate 
reversal, may be different from the judgment entered by the district court.  
6
 Finally, the Court rejected Berkson and Malacky’s argument that LePome could not 
recover attorney’s fees because she was not represented by an attorney at the time she made her 
offer of judgment.  The Court emphasized that when an offeree evaluates an offer of judgment, 
the offeree should not rely on whether an offeror then has counsel, but should be aware that the 
offeror may change his or her mind about representation.  The Court urged that such a policy 
promotes settlement by encouraging the offeree to accept an offer of judgment. Accordingly the 
Court concluded that an unrepresented party who serves an offer of judgment may recover post-
offer fees incurred and paid to a lawyer later hired to represent the offering party.  
   
Conclusion 
 The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that LePome was entitled to the attorney fees and 
costs she incurred on appeal.  Furthermore, a judgment entered by a district court after appellate 
reversal can serve as a basis for attorney’s fees under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115.  Finally, the 
fact that LePome was not represented when she made her offer of judgment to Berkson and 
Malacky did not preclude her award of attorney’s fees and costs.        
 
                                                            
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.115(4); NEV. R. CIV. P. 68(f).  
6See, e.g., Rosenaur v. Scherer, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 674, 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a statute authorizing 
an attorneys fees award at the trial court level includes appellate attorneys fees unless the statute specifically 
provides otherwise) (emphasis added).   
